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1. Returns to investors in PE funds 
The general impression given by coverage of the private equity industry is that it obtains much 
better returns for investors than could be obtained by more conventional investments in shares 
traded on the stock market, and that this explains the great increase in the amounts of money being 
invested in PE funds. 
However, the empirical evidence from a number of studies suggests that investors in PE funds do 
worse than if they invested the stock market.
1
 The increase in investment is then a paradox, which is 
explained by poor information and understanding on the part of investors. 
1.1. Performing below the stock market 
Research by American academics showed that, once the partners‘ fees were excluded, the returns 
actually achieved by PE funds was about the same as the average return on investment in shares on 
the USA stock exchange: ―Over the sample period, average fund returns net of fees approximately 
equal the S&P 500‖. This research covered both venture capital and buyout funds: for buyouts 
alone, it found that the returns net of fees were lower than those of the stock exchange. They also 
found that there was a wide range of different performance across funds, with some achieving much 
better returns than others. An experienced investor offered a similar summary: ‗The large majority 
of buy-out funds fail to add sufficient value to overcome a grossly unreasonable fee structure.‘ 
(Kaplan and Schoar 2005; Swenson 2005).  
 
A series of empirical studies by Dutch and French academics has reached similar conclusions. 
Actual returns to PE funds have been similar to the yields from the stock market investments, and 
changes in returns on PE investments closely reflect general trends in stock market prices and GDP.  
Once adjustments are made for bias in samples, bias in valuing and risk of investments, and after 
deducting the fees of the PE group partners, the returns to investors in PE funds is actually 2.6% per 
year below the returns delivered by investing in shares trading on the stock exchange. The authors 
conclude that: 
 
―…Performance estimates found in previous research and used as industry benchmarks are 
overstated….We conclude that the stunning growth in the amount allocated to this asset class 
cannot be attributed to genuinely high past net performance.‖  (Phalippou and Gottschalg 2007). 
 
The real performance of funds looks even worse than simply mirroring the stock exchange, because 
adjustments have to be made, especially for two factors. Firstly, the value of funds have to be 
reduced in respect of investments in companies which have not yet been exited. It should not be 
assumed that these will yield the same returns as those actually exited, as many of them may not 
have any prospect of ever delivering a return. The value of such funds is normally assumed to be 
substantial whereas the researchers found ―evidence that they mostly represent living dead 
investments‖. Secondly, PE investments are significantly more risky than investments on the stock 
exchange, and adjusting for the extra risk involved further big reduction in the performance of the 
firms. After adjusting for these factors, the research concludes that investing in PE creates a 
massive loss compared with other forms of investment: ―According to this result, investors [in PE 
funds] have lost about 25% of the capital invested‖. 
Table 1.  Poor returns for investors in PE funds compared with stock market 
   Profitability index  
Stock exchange    100 
                                                 
1
 ―While the exact degree of underperformance can be debated, the basic lesson seems clear: the average return from 
private equity is quite unspectacular.‖ (Lerner: The enigma of private equity. Financial Times 24/04/07) 
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PE funds Before adjustments  101 
 After adjustments for bias and risk Buyouts 75 
  Venture capital 77 
Source: calculated from text of Phalippou and Gottschalg 2007 
 
Both the USA and the more recent European studies found that the performance of funds was 
closely linked to past performance of funds. Empirical evidence from these and other studies also 
shows a wide range of performances between different funds: the OECD report refers to a recent 
study which showed the average (mean) return was 22.2%, but the median was negative (-5.3%). In 
effect, this is an indicator of the risk – most PE funds deliver losses, but the successful minority are 
making big profits. (Wright et al 2007A).  
1.2. Investors unclear on returns 
The rush of investors into PE funds is thus a paradox: the partners in the PE groups are taking 
handsome returns, but, overall, the pension funds and others investing in them are receiving worse 
returns than they would by simply investing in the stock market.  
 
This may be partly explained by information asymmetries – investors find it difficult to understand 
what is really happening to the PE funds in which they invest, but do not want to miss out on an 
investment opportunity which is so widely publicised as successful. Investors are impressed by a 
few selected successful investments, or by misleading indicators of returns, or because returns are 
reported before the PE firms deduct their fees, or because of simple ‗headline‘ publicity: ―The 
increased investment is partly due to well-publicized returns of some private equity funds, 
especially at the end of the 1990s.‖ 
  
It may seem surprising that institutional investors with vast resources could be so easily misled, but 
a number of research studies suggest that many have failed to understand the true value of 
investments in PE funds. 
 
Researchers Phalippou and Gottschalg give two striking examples of this. Firstly, they observed 
that some investors did not seem to understand the difference between the gross returns of the PE 
funds – before the partners extracted their fees – and the net returns actually received by investors, 
after these fees had been deducted: ―It is surprising that sophisticated investors would not realize 
the full impact of fees, but our conversations with LPs indicate that it may be true for at least some 
of them‖.  
 
Secondly, they noted that investors often claimed to like PE funds because they had ―doubled‖ their 
money – when in fact they had not. The actual performance of PE funds over the relevant period 
was to deliver 1.77 times the amount invested – worse than the 2.1 multiple which the stock market 
would have delivered over the same period (Phalippou and Gottschalg 2007).  
 
Another study found that big university endowments and public pension funds got much better 
results from their investments in private equity than those whose investments were selected by 
investment advisors and banks, and suggested that some institutions were better at understanding 
private equity (Lerner at al 2005).  
 
But other researchers found that even large institutions seem confused about the actual performance 
of PE. They tried to collect data about the performance of PE funds from major USA institutions 
which had invested in them – including CALPERS, University of Michigan, and University of 
Texas. But there was an unexpected problem: different investors reported different performance 
figures by the same PE fund. There was no way of telling which institution was reporting the 
correct figure for each fund, so their data had to be set aside as useless. (Kaplan and Schoar 2005). 
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1.2.1. Manipulated accounts 
Company accounts may be manipulated by PE funds in order to give a misleadingly good picture. 
The OECD report notes that ―Earnings manipulation…appears to have been evident in a number of 
transactions (e.g. United Airlines)‖, and a recent academic overview stated more bluntly that: 
―Financial performance of buyouts is difficult to measure, particularly in the case of accounting 
measures which have been shown to be plagued by earnings manipulation.‖ (Wright et al 2007A; 
Cumming et al 2007) 
 
1.2.2. IRRs 
Internal rates of return (IRRs) are frequently used as performance measures for private equity funds. 
They can however be misleading, for example by including funds of longer duration (which are 
usually less profitable): if the bias is eliminated the average IRR falls from 14.64% to 12.22%. 
(Phalippou and Gottschalg 2007) 
 
1.2.3. Borrowing from banks to pay dividends  
One way in which PE groups may generate a misleading impression of high returns is through 
‗dividend recapitalisation‘. This involves borrowing more money and using it to pay dividends to 
the partners and investors – often within months of the original takeover. For example, a consortium 
of PE groups bought Hertz Corp. from Ford in December 2005 and six months later paid 
themselves a dividend of $1 billion—nearly half their original investment—funded by new bank 
loans to the company. Similar transactions have taken place in the UK: ―Former private-equity-
backed companies such as Debenhams are struggling on the stock market after aggressive 
refinancings that allowed investors to take out big dividends, while others still in private equity 
hands such as Focus DIY are flirting with collapse after the owners loaded them up with debt when 
they took out profits‖ (Power 2007). Ratings agencies have been concerned that such 
recapitalisations increase the debt burden on companies still further and so increase the risk of 
default. The report to the OECD gives figures showing the sharp rise in the amount of debt used to 
refinance buyouts in Europe, and comments that this increase indicates that PE funds are using 
borrowings to replace equity and pay dividends to investors. (Hall 2006; Standard and Poor 2006; 
Wright at al 2007A) 
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Value of financial restructuring by buyouts in Europe 1997-
2006  (€ million)
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Source: from data in Wright et al 2007  Table 12 
 
2. Information  
The information on real retuuns to investors highlights the importance of information for investors. 
2.1. BVCA on information to investors on portfolio companies 
One of the statements in the BVCA evidence to the select committee is that ―Levels of disclosure 
about the performance of companies in which the private equity firm has invested are much higher 
than in public companies. Private equity and venture capital firms report to their investors regularly, 
typically quarterly. The reporting about the companies in which they have invested goes far beyond, 
is far more detailed and far more up-to-date than how a public company reports to its shareholders.‖ 
(BVCA 2007b, p.7)  
 
This is a surprising claim, which is not supported by the BVCA‘s own ‗Guidelines for reports to 
investors‖, of which the BVCA says: ―These Guidelines set out recommendations, intended to 
represent best practice, on the contents of reports to investors in private equity funds structured as 
limited partnership fixed-life funds.‖ (BVCA 2007) 
 
The section of these guidelines relating to portfolio companies starts by restricting the guidelines 
themselves to companies which represent more than 5% of a fund‘s investment or are among the 10 
biggest companies in the portfolio: for all others, the BVCA makes no information 
recommendations at all. For these largest companies, the guidelines recommend the disclosure of 
the name and address and ―a brief description‖ of the company, and information about the amount 
invested by the fund, its relations with other investors, percentage ownership, value of investment, 
stage of investment, a ―brief analysis of significant events during the reporting period and 
anticipated events‖, and ―disclosure of any significant extraordinary items.‖  
 
The BVCA guidelines thus recommend no information at all about the operations and performance 
of the company. This is far less than is required of companies‘ for basic registration at Companies 
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House – and the BVCA does not even recommend that the Companies House accounts should be 
disclosed to investors - let alone what is expected of stock exchange quoted companies. 
2.2. Creating information monopoly 
Small firms and start-up companies suffer from information opacity – they do not have detailed 
published accounts so potential investors find it difficult to decide whether to invest. Private equity 
companies investing venture capital were a new kind of intermediary solution to this problem, by 
providing active monitoring and support to small start-up firms on behalf of investors (Berger and 
Udell 1998; Gompers and Lerner 2000). Companies which are large, long-established, and publicly 
traded do not suffer from this informational opacity, and information is typically publicly available 
through published accounts, media scrutiny and published research The effect of buyouts by PE 
firms is the reverse: they are taking information about the firms out of the public domain, and the 
PE firms themselves gain a monopoly on information about these companies.   This information 
monopoly creates asymmetries which are problematic not only for employees and unions but also 
for investors and policy makers. 
3. Conclusions 
Investors in PE funds are receiving a poor risk-adjusted return compared with the stock market. 
This fact, and the growth in funds invested in PE despite these poor real returns, indicates that 
investors are disadvantaged by information assymetries, including poor information about the actual 
rate of return being achieved by funds, inflated by unrealistic assumptions about the ‗living dead‘ 
zombie investments. In this respect investors face the same disadvantages as employees. The public 
supply of information has been dominated by the promotion literature of the private equity 
companies. The financial media have failed to provide any correction to this bias, and have 
arguably amplified it by uncritical reproduction of industry claims on returns (as on employment). 
 
Investors need greater rights to information, both about the actual performance of private equity 
funds, and about the performance of companies in which funds have invested, similar to those for 
stock exchange companies.  As with stock exchange companies, this information should be 
published, to ensure that all stakeholders have access to it. Regulatory bodies including the FSA 
should subject the private equity groups to a constant monitoring of results (including employment 
effects), including the development of accurate indicators of funds actual performance. Meanwhile 
trustees of pension funds, in particular, should require comprehensive analysis of risk-adjusted 
returns before committing further investments to private equity funds.  
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
17/05/2010  Page 7 of 8  
  
 
4. Bibliography 
 
Amess K. and Wright M. 2007 The Wage And Employment Effects Of Leveraged Buyouts In The UK. 
Forthcoming: International Journal of Economics and Business 2007 
 
AT Kearney 2007. Creating New Jobs and Value with Private Equity http://www.atkearney.com/  
 
Berger A. & Udell G. 1998."The economics of small business finance: the roles of private equity and debt 
markets in the financial growth cycle," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-15, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 
 
BVCA 2007 Reporting Guidelines http://www.bvca.co.uk/  
 
BVCA/IE 2007 The Economic Impact of Private Equity in the UK.  http://www.bvca.co.uk/  
 
Cumming D., Siegel D., and  Wright M. 2007 Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts and Governance. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=983802  
 
EBRD 2006. Annual Report 2006  http://www.ebrd.org/pubs/general/ar06.pdf  
 
EIB 2007.   www.eib.org  
 
EVCA/CEFS 2005 Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe. EVCA. 
December 2005.       http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_129_att_953.pdf   
 
Froud and Williams 2007. Private equity and the culture of value extraction. Version 2 - February 2007 
CRESC Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 31CRESC The University of Manchester  
 
FT 2007  Private equity deals that cement business growth; by Chris Bryant and Andrew Taylor Financial 
Times April 2, 2007 
 
Gompers P. and Lerner J. 2000 Money chasing deals? The impact of fund inflows on private equity 
valuations. Journal of Financial Economics 55 (2000) 281}325 
 
Gottschalg O., Phalippou L., and Zollo M. 2003 Performance of Private Equity Funds: Another Puzzle? 
INSEAD October 2003 
 
Hall D. 2006 Private equity and infrastructure funds in public services and utilities 
http://www.psiru.org/reports/2006-11-PE.doc 
 
IE/BVCA 2007 The Economic Impact of Private Equity in the UK (full report) Available from BVCA.  
 
Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, 2005.  "Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and 
Capital Flows," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1791-1823, 08. 
 
Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar, and Wan Wong 2005. Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices?: The Limited 
Partner Performance Puzzle. MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4523-05 January 2005 
 
 
NVCA/Global Insights 2007. The Economic Importance of Venture Capital Backed Companies to the U.S. 
Economy Third Edition 2007  http://www.nvca.org/pdf/NVCA_VentureCapital07.pdf 
 
Phalippou L. and Gottschalg O. 2007 The Performance of Private Equity Funds 
 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
17/05/2010  Page 8 of 8  
  
Power H. 2007 Permira lifts the lid on private equity The Sunday Telegraph 11 February 2007  
 
Shleifer, A. and Summers, L.H. (1988). ‗Breach of Trust In Hostile Takeovers‘ in Auerbach A. (ed) Corporate 
Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Standard and Poor 2006. The Dividend Recap Game: Credit Risk Vs. The Allure Of Quick Money. 
Aug.2006. http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,1,0,1145848227253.html  
 
Swenson D. 2005. Unconventional Success: A Fundamental Approach to Personal Investment. Free Press.  
 
Thornton P. 2007 Inside the dark box: shedding light on private equity. The Work Foundation March 2007 
http://www.theworkfoundation.com/products/publications/azpublications/privateequity.aspx  
 
Wright M., Burrows A., Ball R., Scholes L., Meuleman M., and Amess K. 2007a The Implications of 
Alternative Investment Vehicles for Corporate Governance: An Empirical Study by Consultants  
13th Meeting of the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance DAF/CA/CG(2007)1/ANN1 
16th March 2007 
 
Wright M., Jensen M., Cumming D. and Siegel D. 2007b. The Impact of Private Equity: Setting the Record 
Straight.. Working paper.  
 
Zollo, M. and Phalippou, L. 2005 What drives private equity fund performance?  INSEAD 2005 
http://faculty.insead.edu/strategy/buyouts/documents/WhatdrivePEfundsreturnsatMS.pdf  
 
 
 
 
5. Notes 
 
